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Abstract:  Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face 
firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on 
market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country 
asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade 
openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average 
productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an 
unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s 
firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access 
mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade 
openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract 
industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the 
extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the 
bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, 
with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, 
regardless of there being inter-country differences in size. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the effects of trade liberalisation on the process of competitive selection 
between heterogeneous firms in a two country world in which economies are asymmetric in size and 
in labour market institutions.  
 In recent years a considerable body of empirical evidence has highlighted the existence of 
significant intra-industry heterogeneity in firm behaviour and performance. Key stylised facts 
emerging from this literature are that more productive firms are larger, hold larger market shares and 
are more likely to become exporters than less productive firms that operate only in domestic 
markets.1 This empirical evidence has led to theoretical developments that provide micro-
foundations for the existence of inter-firm differences in productivity and performance.2 These 
contributions suggest that the export status of firms and the nature of the competitive selection 
process within industries is influenced by both variable trade costs (reflecting distance-related and 
policy trade barriers) and fixed export costs (reflecting beachhead costs associated with adapting 
operations to a foreign administrative, legal, and regulatory environment). Consistent with the 
standard predictions of models à la Melitz (2003), empirical evidence broadly suggests that trade 
liberalisation (that reduces trade costs) affects aggregate export performance mainly via changes in 
the extensive margin of exports – for instance, Lawless (2010) finds that whilst distance negatively 
affects both the intensive and extensive margins of exports, the coefficient for the latter is 
significantly larger.   
 In most instances in the theoretical literature, the effects of trade liberalisation on inter-firm 
competitive selection and market structure have been studied within settings characterised by inter-
country symmetry.  Notable exceptions are Baldwin and Forslid (2010), who introduce inter-country 
asymmetries in size in a model à la Melitz, and Del Gatto et al. (2007) who introduce inter-country 
asymmetries in size, trade costs and technology in a multi-country model à la Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008). None of these papers, however, considers the existence of labour market imperfections. 
However, concerns that labour market rigidities may hinder the international performance of firms 
and industries are central to current policy debates, with the conventional wisdom holding that, in 
the interest of competitiveness, labour markets deregulation is a necessary response to globalization. 
An implication of this conventional wisdom is that countries with stronger unions ought to show 
                                                 
1 See for instance: Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2004a,b), Eaton et al. (2004) and – for a recent survey – Tybout, J. 
(2003). 
2 Montagna (2001) analyses the effects of trade liberalization on firms’ selection in the presence of inter-country 
differences in firms’ efficiency distributions. Melitz (2003) introduces a fixed export cost in an environment 
characterized by uncertainty about after-entry efficiency and shows how firms with different efficiencies self-select into 
different behaviours, with only more productive firms choosing to become exporters. Among many others, see also: 
Bernard et al. (2003), Yeaple (2004), Bernard et al. (2007), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). For a recent review of the 
literature, see Helpman (2006). 
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lower levels of internationalization of firms – with lower extensive margins (i.e. a smaller number of 
number of exporting firms) and intensive margins (i.e. a lower average exports per firm). Existing 
stylized facts, however, are somewhat at odds with this conventional wisdom: countries with degrees 
of unionization well above the OECD average are among the most internationalised – as 
documented for example by a ISGEP Report (2008), the export participation rate (extensive 
margins) in Sweden, Italy and West Germany (countries characterised by relatively high degrees of 
unionisation) is 83%, 69.3% and 69.3%, respectively.3  
 In this paper we conjecture that these stylised facts may result from the interaction between 
selection processes and the effects of unionisation, in particular we argue that an important channel 
through which unions affect competitive selection is via their effect on aggregate demand – i.e. 
unions do not only affect firms’ costs but also the size of their market.  
 As shown in Montagna and Nocco (2012), labour market imperfections may not have entirely 
obvious effects on the equilibrium efficiency distribution of firms. This is particularly relevant when 
countries are asymmetric not only in their labour market institutions, but also in other dimensions, 
such as market size. In this paper we also focus on unionised labour markets, but we consider in 
greater depth the effects of trade liberalisation and their interaction with inter-country asymmetries 
in unions’ bargaining power and in market size in determining equilibrium outcomes.  
Most papers that study the effects of labour market imperfections on competitive selection 
and trade do not focus on the role of unions. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) use a fair-wage effort 
mechanism. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) focus on the effects of hiring and firing rigidities on trade 
and unemployment, and Helpman et al. (2010) assume workers to be heterogeneous in some 
unobservable ability.4 Unionization is considered by Eckel and Egger (2009) who develop a right-
to-manage model of wage determination, but within a different context from ours that focuses only 
on internationalised firms and on multinational production. Furthermore, with the exception of 
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman et al. (2010), who consider inter-country asymmetries 
in the degree of labour market frictions, all the above mentioned works differ from our model in 
that they assume fully symmetric countries. 
  In our model, firms in the monopolistically competitive sector face firm-specific unions with 
which they negotiate the wage according to a right-to-manage model. We allow for the bargaining 
power of unions to differ across economies. We show that for given levels of variable and fixed 
trade costs, an increase in the bargaining power of a country’s unions relative to that of foreign 
unions makes it easier for firms to survive in the domestic market and makes it more difficult to 
                                                 
3 See Table 2 in the ISGEP Report (2008). 
4 Vannoorenberghe (2011) analyses the effects of trade liberalisation on the skill premium in a Melitz model in which 
there exist two types of labour.  
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export (i.e. it reduces the productivity cut-off facing domestic producers and increases that of 
exporters). This result is independent of the relative size of countries. The latter, instead, plays a 
significant role in determining the other market structure variables: we find that the effects of trade 
liberalisation on both the extensive and intensive margins of export ultimately rest on the interplay 
between market access, competition, and aggregate demand effects. The relative magnitudes of these 
effects are affected by the degree of inter-country asymmetries in union strength and in market size, 
as well as by the initial level of trade openness.   
 A key result of our paper is that whilst a relatively high bargaining power of domestic unions 
(by resulting in a wage cost disadvantage) weakens the competitive position of a country’s firms vis-
à-vis that of its competitors, the resulting higher wages reinforce standard market access 
mechanisms (stemming from market segmentation) via  aggregate income effects: essentially, 
despite their negative impact on firms’ price competitiveness, higher union power and wages 
combine with market access forces to generate a ‘keynesian’ type expansionary effect on aggregate 
demand. We show that when the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, there are 
circumstances in which this expansionary effect can act as a catalyst for industry as well as lead to 
an increase in the extensive margin of exports. Clearly, if the difference in bargaining power 
becomes too large, then the negative effects of higher wages on firms’ competitiveness will 
dominate.  
 We also find that, when differences in the bargaining power of unions in the two countries is 
sufficiently large, trade liberalization can produce a pro-variety effect, giving rise to an increase in 
the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries – even if the countries are identical 
in size.5  
 Typically, the average size of firms selling in the domestic market (defined over both exporter 
and non-exporters) is smaller the stronger a country’s unions. However, the average size of 
exporters (i.e. the intensive margin) – which falls as trade becomes more open in both countries – is 
larger in the relatively more unionized country at all levels of openness. Differences in country size 
do not alter this result.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the set up and derives the 
equilibrium of the model. Section 3 studies the effects of trade liberalisation on competitive 
selection and market structure, whilst Section 4 analyses the effects of unionisation and changes in 
trade openness on real wages. Section 5 concludes the paper. Most of the derivations of the formulae 
are contained in the Appendix. 
 
                                                 
5 This result differs from the ‘anti-variety’ effect found, in the absence of unions, by Baldwin and Forslid (2010) 
whereby the number of varieties bought by a typical consumer falls monotonically as the freeness of trade increases.  
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2. THE MODEL 
The world consists of two economies (home and foreign) each producing a homogeneous good 
within a perfectly competitive sector and a horizontally differentiated good within a 
monopolistically competitive industry.  Labour is the only primary input of production and the 
economies are endowed with an inelastically supplied quantity of workers. In the monopolistic 
sector, firm-specific unions bargain with firms over the wage. The homogeneous good is freely 
traded. Retaining this good as the numeraire then implies that the wage in this sector is equal to one 
in both countries.  In the differentiated good sector, markets are segmented, in the sense that 
exporting firms incur a per-unit (iceberg) trade cost τ>1.  
 We shall focus on inter-country differences in market size (as captured by the size of the 
labour endowment) and in labour market institutions (in the form of asymmetric bargaining powers 
of unions). The model discussion will be in terms of the home country. Whenever appropriate, the 
foreign country’s variables will be denoted by an asterisk.   
 
2.1 Preferences 
Consumers' preferences are assumed to be the same in both countries and to be defined over a 
composite index of a differentiated good, D, and a homogeneous competitive good, A. Thus, the 
utility function of the representative household in each country will be given by:   
(1)     ( ) ( )( )
1
1( , ) 1
A D
U A D
μ μ
μ μμ μ
−
−= − , 
with 10 << μ . Using the homogeneous good as the numeraire, and setting its price to unity, the 
budget constraint of the representative household is:  
PD A I+ = , 
where I is the household’s income and P is the price (index) of the differentiated good. Constrained 
maximisation of (1) then yields: 
( )1A Iμ= − , 
and 
ID
P
μ= . 
 The quantity index D is a sub-utility function defined over a continuum of varieties of the 
horizontally differentiated good, given by:  
( ) 11
0
M
D D i di
σ
σσ
σ
−−⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ , 
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where ( )D i  is consumption of a typical variety i, σ>1 is the (constant) elasticity of substitution 
between varieties, and M is the endogenous set of varieties available for consumption in the 
country; specifically: *D XM N N= + , where DN is the mass of varieties produced within the country 
and *XN  is the mass of imported varieties. Maximising D subject to the relevant constraint and 
imposing duality then implies that the demand for each variety i supplied to the domestic market 
and the price index P are respectively given by: 
(2)      1
( )( ) p iD i I
P
σ
σμ
−
−= , 
and   
(3)     
*
1 1 * 1
0 0
( ) ( )
D XN N
P p i di p i diσ σ σ− − −= +∫ ∫  
 
2.2 Production 
The production technology is the same in both countries. In the competitive sector, firms use a 
constant returns to scale technology, with one unit of the homogeneous good requiring one unit of 
labour. In the differentiated good sector, to start producing, each firm i bears a fixed entry cost If  in 
terms of the homogeneous good that covers the cost of the innovation and R&D efforts required to 
develop a variety of the good. In addition, the firm incurs a fixed operating cost, always in terms of 
the homogeneous good, to cover plant and production line outlays. This fixed cost differs depending 
on the firm’s destination market; specifically, the beachhead fixed cost is given by Df  for domestic 
sales and Xf  for exports. The operational fixed costs Df  and Xf are also expressed in terms of the 
homogeneous good.6  We shall further assume that Xf > Df .  The fixed cost of innovation If  is 
sunk after entry. To produce a quantity q(i) of the good, a typical firm i has a variable input 
requirement of )(ilm  units of labour, as described by the following production function: 
(4)      
)(
)()(
ic
iliq m= , 
where c(i) is the quantity of labour required to produce one unit of good i and is therefore an inverse 
measure of the productivity of the firm. Productivity is assumed to be heterogeneous across firms.   
                                                 
6 Following Baldwin and Forslid (2004, 2010), we assume these fixed costs to correspond to the flow-equivalent of total 
fixed costs. Specifically, we ignore discounting by assuming that firms die according to a Poisson process with a hazard 
rate of δ. Hence, given that the expected life of a variety is 1/δ, the flow equivalent of the total life-time fixed 
innovation cost IF  is I If Fδ= . The same reasoning applies for the other two fixed costs Df  and Xf  in the model. 
Finally, as Baldwin and Forslid (2004) and Melitz (2003), we shall focus on steady states. 
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 Prior to entry, all firms are identical. Since R&D is an uncertain activity, however, it is 
plausible to assume that it is only after making the irreversible investment If , that a firm learns 
how productive its technology, as measured by the parameter 1/c(i), is. Thus, we assume that the 
sunk investment cost delivers a new horizontally differentiated variety with a random unit labour 
requirement c(i) drawn from some cumulative distribution, G(c). As a result, R&D generates a 
distribution of entrants across marginal costs, with a firm i that produces in the economy facing the 
marginal cost of production )()( iciwm , where )(iwm  is the wage perceived by the workers it 
employs. We assume G(c) to be the same in both countries. 
 Denoting domestic sales and exports with ( )Dq i  and ( )Xq i  respectively, then the output of a 
purely domestic firm is ( ) ( )Dq i q i= , and the output of a firm that supplies both the domestic and 
the foreign markets is ( ) ( ) ( )D Xq i q i q i= + .   
 Due to the transport cost involved in international trade, the delivered cost abroad of a unit 
produced with cost )()( iciwm  is ( ) ( )mw i c iτ .  Thus, while in equilibrium production for the domestic 
market ( )Dq i  necessarily coincides with sales ( )D i  in that market, trade costs make the production 
for exports, ( )Xq i , exceed the sales in the foreign country, ( )XD i , that is: ( ) ( )X Xq i D iτ= .  A firm’s 
profits from domestic and foreign sales are then respectively given by:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )D D m D Di p i w i c i q i fπ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ ,  and  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j
X
X X m X
q ii p i w i c i fπ τ τ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ , 
conditional on the productivity distribution of the entrants that will decide to produce.7  
 Profit maximisation subject to the demand functions in (2) implies that the optimal price rules 
that firm i sets for its domestic and export markets are respectively given by:  
(5)     ( ) ( ) ( )
1D m
p i w i c iσσ= −    and    ( ) ( ) ( )1X mp i w i c i
σ τσ= − , 
which implies that equilibrium prices in the export market are a multiple – by a constant factor of 
proportionality τ  – of  those in the domestic market.  
 
2.3.  Wages 
In the homogenous perfectly competitive good sector, the labour market is perfectly competitive 
and all employers pay the same wage. Since the price of the good and the value of the marginal 
product of labour in this sector are both fixed at unity, the wage rate, cw , is also equal to 1. In 
                                                 
7 As in Baldwin and Forslid (2010) “[s]ince the beachhead costs are sunk, firms consider the present value of operating 
profits and the beachhead costs. Given the constant firm-death rate δ and the zero discount rate, the present value of a 
given firm is just π/δ, where π is the operating profit the firm would earn if it actually produces.” 
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contrast, labour in the monopolistic sector is unionised. We adopt the right-to-manage model, with 
the wage being determined in a bargaining process between the firm specific union and the firm and 
the latter choosing (output, and hence) employment unilaterally. 
 The wages for a firm producing only for the domestic market and for one that produces for 
both the domestic and the foreign markets are determined, respectively, by solving the following 
Nash bargaining problems: 
{ } ( )
( )
( ) ( )max ln ( ) ( ) 1 1 ln
1m
m mD
iD mD m
w i
w i l iv l i w i v σ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤Π = − + − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ −⎣ ⎦
 
and:  
 { } ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
max ln ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 ln
1m
m mD mX
iX mD mX m
w i
w i l i l i
v l i l i w i v σ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤+⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Π = + − + − ⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
,  
subject to the labour demands in (A.3) in the Appendix, where ]1,0[∈v  is the bargaining power of 
the union. Note that when v=1, the model collapses into the monopoly model in which employment 
is unilaterally determined by the employer, and the wage is unilaterally fixed by the union, taking 
into account the effect of changes in wages on employment and on prices.  The firm’s objective 
function is its profits above its reservation utility,8 which is 0 Dfπ = −  for a domestic firm, and 
0 ( )D Xf fπ = − +  for a firm that also exports; the union maximises the total labour rent above the 
constant wage paid to non-unionised workers ( 1cw = ).  It can be easily verified that, for both 
domestic-only and exporting firms, the bargained wage will be:  
(6)   ( ) 1
1m m
vw i w σ= = + −  
which is independent of the firm-specific productivity level and hence is the same for all firms.  
Clearly, the union wage exceeds the reservation wage by a mark-up that is positively related to the 
bargaining power of unions.9  
 Using (6), the prices set by firms can now be written as:  
(7)  ( ) 1 ( )
1 1D
vp i c iσσ σ
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠   and ( ) 1 ( )1 1X
vp i c iσ τσ σ
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ .  
Hence, despite paying a common wage, for a given ν, firms with lower unit labour requirements 
will set lower prices and sell larger quantities than less efficient firms. 
                                                 
8 Firms’ maximised profits from domestic and foreign sales are given by expression (A.4) in the Appendix. 
9 The fact that mark-ups (of both firms and unions) are constant in this model depends on the CES framework. Firm-
specific mark-ups and wages are obtained in Montagna and Nocco (2012) within a similar framework that relies 
however on a quasi-linear utility function. The advantage of the current specification is that it allows for income effects 
to emerge.   
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 The labour market clearing condition c mL L L= −  and the definition of aggregate income 
c m mI L w L= +  – where L is total labour supply, and cL  and mL  are the employment levels in the 
competitive and differentiated sector, respectively – complete the model.  
 
2.4. The long-run equilibrium  
Free entry and exit of firms into the monopolistically competitive industry implies that expected 
profits are driven to zero in equilibrium. A potential entrant faces uncertainty about its productivity. 
This uncertainty is resolved after paying the fixed entry cost If , at which point the firm’s 
productivity is revealed. A firm will be able to operate in the domestic market only if its 
productivity can generate a level of variable profit that suffices to cover the fixed production cost 
fD. Similarly, in order to be able to export, a firm’s productivity draw needs to be sufficiently high 
so as to generate a variable profit that can cover the additional fixed export cost fX and the variable 
iceberg trade cost. A competitive selection process follows entry: only firms with productivity 
above a certain threshold will be able to operate in the domestic market. The possibility of 
international trade, and the fact that trade is costly, gives rise to an additional selection process 
between exporting and non-exporting firms – with only relatively more productive firms being able 
to export. The process of competitive selection results in a partitioning of firms which is determined 
by the endogenous emergence of two cut-offs for c –  denoted by Dc  and Xc , respectively – that 
correspond to the upper limit of the range of c over which firms produce only for the local market 
and that over which firms also export. Hence, for a given number of entrants, EN , a mass 
( )D D EN G c N=  of firms will sell only in the domestic market and a mass ( )X X EN G c N=  of firms 
will also export. The two cut-off levels are defined respectively by: 
(8)     
{ }
{ }
sup : ( ) 0
sup : ( ) 0
D D D
X X X
c c c
c c c
π
π
= =
= =  
which describe the (zero-profit) indifference conditions of marginal firms. As a result, firms that are 
just able to cover their fixed costs for domestic and export sales are, respectively, characterized by: 
(9)    
( ) 0 1
1 1
( ) 0 1
1 1
D D D D
X X X X
vc p c
vc p c
σπ σ σ
σπ τσ σ
⎛ ⎞= ⇔ = +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= ⇔ = +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
. 
It is easy to show that the productivity cut-offs for firms based in the home country satisfy the 
relationship: 
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X Dc c= Λ , 
where 
11
* 11 1
*
X
D
fI P
I P f
σσ τ −− − ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Λ ≡ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ .
10  Clearly, the minimum efficiency required to export 
depends ultimately on the relative size of the two markets and on the fixed and variable trade costs. 
In the special case of symmetric countries (i.e. where *I I=  and *P P= ), we have: 
1
1
1 X
D
f
f
στ −− ⎛ ⎞Λ ≡ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,  which is less than unity.  When countries are asymmetric, other things equal, Λ 
will be larger (i.e. Xc  will be larger relative to Dc ) the larger is the relative size of the country’s 
trading partner. A large foreign market can offsets the effects of trade costs on the minimum 
efficiency required to export: by being able to ‘sustain’ the exporting activity of relatively less 
efficient producers, a large foreign market will thus work towards an increase in the extensive 
margin of export of the domestic industry. These results are consistent with stylised facts that 
suggest that larger numbers of small exporters can succeed in operating in foreign markets that are  
‘easier to access’11 – either because they involve lower trade costs or because they are larger. 
 
2.4.1. Derivation of the cut-offs 
As is standard in the literature given its consistency with stylised facts about the productivity 
distribution of firms within industries,12 we choose to work with a Pareto distribution as the specific 
parameterisation of G(c). This distribution has a higher unit labour requirement bound Mc and shape 
parameter κ≥1: 
( ) , [0, ]M
M
cG c c c
c
κ⎛ ⎞= ∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
Using this parameterization, the free entry zero expected profit condition:  
                                                 
10 To see this, note that firm i’s revenue from exports can be written as 
* * 1
1
1( ) ( )X D
I Pr i r i
IP
σ
σ
σ τ
−
−
−=  and that the 
relationship between the revenue of firms i and j ( i j≠ ) operating in the same market implies: 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
D X
D X
r j r j c j
r i r i c i
σ−⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. Making use of these the zero profit conditions from domestic and foreign sales then leads to 
the relationship discussed above.  
11 See for instance, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007). 
12 See for instance Del Gatto et al. (2007).  
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0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
D Xc c
D X Ic dG c c dG c fπ π+ =∫ ∫  
can be rewritten as: 
(10)    ( ) ( ) ( ) 11D D X X I Mf c f c f cκ κ κ κ σσ− ++ = − , 
where 1−> σκ  is a necessary condition for the integral in the free entry condition to converge. 
Then, making use of the income expression in (A.6) derived in the Appendix, a relationship can be 
derived between Dc  and 
*
Xc  that effectively determines the efficiency composition of the (domestic 
and foreign) population of firms that compete for the domestic market and hence reflects the 
competitive pressure that domestic firms face from foreign exporters:  
(11)     ( )
1
11*
*
1
1
1
1
X
X D
D
v
fc c
v f
σστ
σ
−−
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠+⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. 
 
It is clear from (11), that asymmetries in labour market institutions play an important role in 
determining the relationship between Dc  and 
*
Xc .   This relationship can now be used in the free 
entry zero expected profit condition in (10) for both countries in the following system of equations: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )* *
1
1
1
1
D D X X I M
D D X X I M
f c f c f c
f c f c f c
κ κ κ
κ κ κ
κ σ
σ
κ σ
σ
− +⎧ + =⎪⎪ −⎨ − +⎪ + =⎪ −⎩
, 
that can be solved to yield:  
(12)  [ ]
1
2 2
1
11
1
I
D M
D
fc c
f
κκ
σφνρ φ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪−⎝ ⎠= −⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 ,    and 
1
*
2 2
1
11
1
I
D M
D
fc c
f
κκ
ρ σφ ν φ ρ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪−⎡ ⎤ ⎝ ⎠= −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , 
where: 1κρ τ −≡ <  represents an inverse measure of trade costs (i.e. it captures the ‘freeness’ of 
trade); 
1
1
1D
X
f
f
κ
σφ
−−⎛ ⎞≡ <⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 is an inverse measure of the size of the export fixed cost relative to the 
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domestic one;13 and 
*
1
1
1
1
v
v v
κ
σ
σ
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟−≡ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
  is an inverse measure of the power of domestic unions relative 
to foreign ones – with v<1 when *ν ν> . The condition φρφρ
1~ << v  ensures that Dc >0 (by the 
second inequality) and *Dc >0 (by the first inequality).
14 It is clear from (12) that for a given level of 
economic integration between the two countries, as determined by ρ  and Xf , an increase in the 
relative domestic bargaining power of unions (i.e. a fall in v ) results in an increase in the cut-off for 
domestic producers, Dc : thus, if domestic unions become more powerful (or if foreign unions 
become less so) it becomes easier for domestic firms to survive in equilibrium.   
 Given the relationship in (11), we can also derive the two countries’ exporters cut-off points. 
Reporting, for ease of exposition, only that for the home country, we have:    
(13)    [ ]
1
1
1
2 2
1
1
1
I
X M
D
fc c
f
κ
κ σ
κ
σρ ν φρ φφ ρ
+ −
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪−⎝ ⎠= −⎨ ⎬⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 , 
which shows that an increase in the bargaining power of domestic unions, v , (or a decrease in the 
foreign bargaining power of unions, *v ), by decreasing the cut-off of domestic exporters Xc , 
toughens the selection process into the exporting status – i.e. it makes it more difficult for firms to 
be able to survive in the export market.15 These results can be summarised in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: For given levels of variable and fixed trade costs, an increase in the bargaining 
power of domestic unions relative to that of foreign unions (i.e. a fall in v ) increases the cut-
off of domestic producers, Dc , and reduces the cut-off of domestic exporters, Xc .  
The intuition behind this proposition is that an increase in the bargaining power of domestic union 
has a cost effect and a market size effect on firms’ profitability. The former is a direct result of the 
increase in wage which, other things equal, makes firms less competitive relatively to foreign 
producers in both the domestic and foreign markets. The existence of a per-unit trade cost 
compounds this adverse wage effect on firms’ ability to export by making it more difficult to cover 
                                                 
13 Hence, 0 1φρ≤ ≤ gives an overall measure of the freeness of trade. 
14 Given (11), these conditions will also ensure the positivity of  *Xc  and of Xc . 
15 These results are in line with those in Montagna and Nocco (2012). 
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the fixed export costs.  As will become clearer later, however, this cost effect is accompanied by a 
market size effect since the higher wages have an expansionary effect on the size of the domestic 
market – with a higher aggregate income leading to an expansion in the aggregate demand for the 
differentiated good.16 This market size effect dominates the cost effect of higher wages on firms’ 
profits and leads to a reduction in the minimum level of efficiency required to survive in the 
market.17    
 Finally, to complete the solution of the model, as shown in the Appendix, we derive the 
expressions for EN  and 
*
EN .  As will become clearer from subsequent numerical analysis, in the 
country with stronger unions, the ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect of an increase in union power will 
‘attract’ industry (i.e. increase entry and the number of surviving firms) and can result in an 
increase in the extensive margin of exports despite the fall in Xc .
18  
 
3.  THE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION  
In this Section, we discuss the effects produced by trade liberalization in the presence of 
asymmetries between countries. Specifically, we consider how a reduction in both variable and 
fixed costs of exporting affects the competitive selection process in the two countries when they 
differ in market size, as captured by differences in labour endowments, and in their labour market 
institutions, reflected by different bargaining power of unions.   
 
3.1. A reduction in variable trade costs 
3.1.1.  Effects on cut-offs 
When countries differ in size ( *L L≠ ) and labour market institutions ( *v v≠ ), a reduction of the 
variable cost of export (i.e. an increase in ρ) does not produce unambiguous effects on the domestic 
and foreign cut-offs, in contrast with what established by those contributions to the literature that 
focus on the case of symmetric countries. That is, while in the standard symmetric model à la 
Melitz (2003) with no unions, an increase in the freeness of trade ρ  decreases Dc  and increases Xc  
                                                 
16 As is shown in the Appendix, an increase in union power has redistributive effects, resulting in higher real wages in 
the monopolistic sector and in lower real wages in the competitive sector. The expansionary effect of an increase in v, 
however, is driven by the fact that the former dominates the latter.  
17 Similarly, an increase in the foreign bargaining power of unions, *v , by toughening the competitive selection process 
among foreign competitors, toughens the foreign competition that domestic firms face their domestic market (i.e. 
Dc falls), but softens the competition that domestic exporters face in the foreign market – thus increasing the cut-off of 
domestic exporters, Xc . 
18 This can be seen in Figure 6.c where the Nx curve shifts upward if v increases – i.e. for a given level of openness ρ, 
the mass of exporters increases in v.  
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for both countries, with asymmetric countries this is not always true. The standard effects continue 
to hold only when the two countries have similar or equal levels of union bargaining power (even 
though they may differ in market size). Instead, if the bargaining power of domestic unions is 
sufficiently large relative to that of foreign unions (i.e. if ν  is sufficiently small), a fall in variable 
trade costs is found to increase the domestic cut-off and reduce the export cut-off.  Specifically, we 
find that Dcρ
∂
∂ >0 and 
Xc
ρ
∂
∂ <0 if:    
(14)      2 2
2 1
1
v φρφ ρ< ≡ Ω <+ , 
while the opposite holds true otherwise. Symmetrically, for the foreign country, it is easy to verify 
that 
*
Dc
ρ
∂
∂  is positive and ρ∂
∂ *Xc  is negative if: 
(15)       1v > Ω  
while the opposite holds true otherwise. Hence, following a process of integration that reduces 
variable trade costs, contrary to the symmetric case analysed in the literature, the domestic cut-off 
for the foreign country *Dc  increases and the foreign export cut-off 
*
Xc  falls if v  is low relatively to 
*v . 
 Clearly, these conditions are more likely to hold the larger is Ω. Given that Ω is increasing in 
both ρ and φ, then – for a given higher bargaining power of domestic unions relative to foreign 
unions – an increase in ρ is more likely to increase the domestic cut-offs Dc  and *Dc  and reduce the 
export cut-off Xc  and 
*
Xc  when variable transport costs are low (i.e. ρ is large) and when the fixed 
cost of export is small (i.e. φ is large).19   
 These results are summarised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: When variable and/or fixed trade costs are sufficiently low, for given differences 
between the two countries’ labour market institutions, a trade liberalization resulting in a 
reduction in variable trade costs (i.e. an increase in ρ): (i) reduces the average productivity of 
domestic firms selling in the domestic market in the country with relatively stronger unions, 
while it increases it in that with relatively weaker unions, and (ii) increases the average 
                                                 
19 With imperfect integration (i.e. Xf > Df  and  ρ<1), Ω  is increasing in ρ from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of  
2
2( 1) 1
1
ρφ ρΩ = = <+ . With perfect integration, Ω =1. 
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productivity of exporting firms that operate in the country with relatively stronger unions, 
while it reduces it in that with relatively weaker unions. 
 The impact of a reduction in variable trade costs on the domestic cut-off, Dc , is determined by 
two main effects: an import competition effect and an aggregate demand effect. The former occurs 
because of an increase in the competitive pressure facing domestic firms, as the fall in trade costs 
makes it easier for foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. As in the symmetric model, other 
things equal, the import competition effect works towards a reduction in Dc . The aggregate demand 
effect results from a reduction in the industry price index triggered by the fall in trade costs – that 
leads to an increase in the aggregate demand for the differentiated good; the resulting increase in 
firms’ revenue makes it easier for firms to cover their fixed production costs. This effects works 
towards an increase in Dc . Note that the import competition effect is weaker when trade integration 
is already high. At the same time, the aggregate demand effect is stronger, because of higher wages 
and hence income, when domestic unions have a high bargaining power. Thus, for sufficiently high 
values of ρ and φ and for sufficiently low values of v , the net effect of an increase in ρ on Dc  is 
positive.   
 As in the standard symmetric model, an increase in ρ will work towards an increase of the 
export cut-off, Xc , via a market access effect which occurs because a reduction in variable trade 
costs makes it easier for domestic exporters to access foreign markets. An easier access to the 
foreign market, however, also exposes domestic exporters to a competition effect by indigenous 
firms in that market. This competition is tougher the higher is the relative bargaining power of 
domestic unions – which translates in higher wages, and hence in higher marginal costs and lower 
competitiveness, for exporting firms. This effect works towards a reduction in the export cut-off 
Xc . When trade integration is already high and the relative bargaining power of domestic unions is 
high, the net effect of an increase in ρ will then be to reduce Xc , as the market access effect is 
relatively weak and the cost effect of higher wages is relatively strong.  
 The same intuition applies to the effects of trade liberalisation on the trading partner’s cut-off. 
If trade is already sufficiently free and the country’s unions relative strength is high (conditions that 
for the foreign country are summarised by the inequality 1v > Ω ), then the effects of an increase in 
ρ leads to a relaxation of the competitive pressure on domestic firms (i.e. to an increase in the 
domestic cut-off, *Dc ) and to a tightening of competitive pressure on foreign exporters (i.e. to a 
reduction of the export cut-off *Xc ).   
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  Table 1 summarizes our findings on the effects produced by an increase in the level of 
economic integration that results from a reduction in the level of the iceberg trade costs. 
 
 
v < Ω  1vΩ < < Ω  
1v > Ω  
 
If ρ ↑   
 
D Xc c↑ ↓  
* *
D Xc c↓ ↑  
D Xc c↓ ↑  
* *
D Xc c↓ ↑  
D Xc c↓ ↑  
* *
D Xc c↑ ↓  
Table 1.    Effects of changes in ρ on the cut-offs (with  Ω<1) 
 
The central column of Table 1 shows that the traditional effects produced by trade liberalization in 
the case of symmetric countries still hold in the case of asymmetric countries when their relative 
difference in the bargaining power of unions  is not very large (that is, when 1vΩ < < Ω ). In this 
case, as in the specific case of symmetric labour market institutions (i.e. when v = *v , which implies 
that 1v = ), we obtain the results that apply in the standard case: when integration increases, the cut-
offs for sales in the domestic market fall, while they increase for firms exporting to the foreign 
market – with standard competitive selection effects in action.  
 Differences in the labour market sizes of the two countries do not affect the way in which the 
cut-offs are influenced by the changes in the level of economic integration analysed in this Section. 
 
3.1.2.  Effects on market structure 
We now turn to examine the effects that an increase in ρ produces on the economies’ market 
structures. Given that in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in market size and in labour 
market institutions, comparative statics on the equilibrium solutions is analytically unwieldy, we 
shall rely on numerical simulations.  For ease of exposition, unless otherwise stated, in what follows 
we shall consider the case in which the home country is characterised by a higher relative 
bargaining power of unions (i.e. 1v < ).  To start with, unless otherwise stated, we shall also assume 
that the two countries are identical in size (i.e. *L L= ).  
  As for the industry cut-off points, the effects of trade liberalisation on market structure 
ultimately rest on the interplay between market access, competition, and aggregate demand effects. 
The relative magnitudes of these effects are affected by the degree of inter-country asymmetries in 
union strength and in market size, as well as by the initial level of trade openness.  
 17
Proposition 3:  For given differences between the two countries’ labour market institutions and for 
sufficiently high levels of integration (i.e. for large ρ and small Xf ) in the country with 
stronger unions, a trade liberalization resulting in a reduction in variable trade costs (i.e. an 
increase in ρ) tends to reduce: (i) the mass entrants, (ii) the mass of domestic firms producing 
for the domestic market, and (iii) the mass of exporters.  In the country with weaker unions, an 
increase in ρ tends to increase: (i) the mass entrants, (ii) the mass of domestic firms producing 
for the domestic market, and (iii) the mass of exporters.  
Via a competition effect, trade liberalisation will hurt the industry in the country with stronger 
unions, i.e. it will works towards a reduction in the number of firms entering the domestic industry 
( EN ). This is because, other things equal, a relative higher bargaining power of domestic unions (by 
resulting in higher wages) weakens the competitive positions of the home country’s firms vis-à-vis 
their foreign competitors. Ceteris paribus, in these circumstances, a reduction in variable trade costs 
will – by increasing the competitive pressure facing firms – will works towards a reduction in the 
number of firms entering the domestic industry ( EN ); this can be seen in Figure 1.
20 Nevertheless, 
the sign of EN ρ∂ ∂ is not unambiguous. Specifically, in the country with the stronger unions, 
0EN ρ∂ ∂ <  is more likely to hold the higher the initial levels of trade openness (i.e. the larger is 
ρ),  the lower the levels of fixed export costs,  and the smaller the relative size advantage of the 
country (this can be seen in Figure 2). At large values of ρ, further trade liberalisation in the 
presence of a wage cost disadvantage due to stronger unions reduces EN and may eventually result 
in firms only attempting entry in the country with the more liberal labour market (i.e. EN  can go to 
zero, as seen in Figure 1).21  However, this negative effect on entry of the lower competitiveness 
resulting from a high bargaining power of unions is mitigated, and can even be more than offset, by 
market access and aggregate demand effects whereby trade liberalisation favours the larger country 
with stronger unions. Specifically, entry increases with trade liberalization for: (i) sufficiently low 
levels of trade openness (i.e. small values of ρ), (ii) a sufficiently large size of the domestic market 
relative to the foreign one, and (iii) sufficiently high level of export fixed cost. Furthermore, the 
level of entry may also be higher than in its trading partner – that is, starting from a low level of 
integration, the larger and more unionised country will enjoy higher entry (i.e.  NE>NE*, as seen in 
Figure 3.a). When ρ is small, there is a high incidence of trade costs on consumer expenditure. In 
this case, the larger country will attract relatively more firms – as a result of a standard market 
                                                 
20 All Figures in this Section are drawn for the following values of the parameters: 0.3μ = , 3Mc = , 2.5κ = , 2.4σ = , 
0.1If = , 0.1Df = , * 1000L = and * 0.3v = . The values of the other parameters are given in the Figures. 
21 In Baldwin and Forslid (2010) a similar ‘delocation’ effect results from differences in market size. 
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access effect. This market access mechanism is reinforced, via an income effect, by the higher 
wages resulting from stronger unions; essentially, despite their negative impact on firms’ price 
competitiveness, higher union power and wages combine with market access forces to generate a 
‘keynesian’ type expansionary effect on aggregate demand that acts as a catalyst for industry. 
Clearly, if the difference in bargaining power becomes too large, then the negative effects of higher 
wages on firms’ competitiveness will dominate. As a result, the smaller is v  the lower the level of 
economic integration at which this combined expansionary effect will occur, as illustrated by Figure 
3.b. Other things equal, this expansionary effect will also be stronger the higher is the fixed cost of 
exports (as shown by the blue lines in Figures 3.a-b) – which effectively protects the domestic 
market.  
 Shifting the focus of analysis on to the number of surviving firms, we find that in the home 
country, where the bargaining power of unions is higher, the number of domestic firms selling in 
the domestic market (ND) is monotonically decreasing in ρ (see Figure 4.a). Instead, in the less 
unionized foreign country, ND* first falls and then – as ρ increases – increases when the fixed export 
cost is low (see the black line in Figure 4.b). However, when the fixed export cost is high, ND* 
typically falls as ρ increases (see the blue line in Figure 4.b). This is robust to the degree of 
asymmetry in country size. Hence, contrary to the case analysed by Baldwin and Forslid (2010) 
with no unions (where with identical market sizes trade liberalisation reduces the number of 
produced varieties in each country), in this paper a fall in trade costs can increase the number of 
produced varieties in the country that has a relative wage cost advantage due to weaker unions.  
However, for sufficiently low levels of trade openness, despite the fact that trade liberalisation 
reduces the number of firms producing in the domestic market in the country with stronger unions, 
this country will have a larger population of firms than its trading partner – i.e. the ratio ND/N*D  is 
greater than one at sufficiently low values of ρ (Figure 5.a). If trade is very open, instead, the less 
unionized country will have a larger population of firms – even when it has a smaller size. Hence, 
the effect of market size does not offset the competitive disadvantage of a higher wage when the 
competitive pressure from trade is strong. Thus, ND/N*D can be non-monotonic in ρ: it is greater 
than one at low levels of ρ and falls to below one for sufficiently large values of ρ.22 The ‘turning 
point’ (i.e. the value of ρ at which ND become smaller than N*D) will occur at lower values of ρ the 
higher is the relative strength of domestic unions (see dotted lines in Figure 5.a). The existence of 
differences in country size in favour of the domestic country increases the level of ρ at which 
ND/N*D falls below one (to see this, compare Figure 5.a with Figure 5.b where countries have the 
                                                 
22 If the fixed export cost is sufficiently large, then ND/N*D is more likely to be monotonically increasing in ρ (Figure 
5.a).  
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same size). This is consistent with the intuition that a larger country size offsets to some extent the 
adverse effects of a higher union power.  
 To summarize: the country with more powerful unions has a competitive disadvantage that 
works towards a smaller number of domestic firms surviving in the economy. However, if the 
country is sufficiently protected from international competition, other things equal, the number of 
firms in this economy will be higher than that in the less unionized country; we have explained this 
as an expansionary market size effect (with higher wages translating into a higher aggregate 
demand for this good that facilitates survival). If the fixed cost of export is sufficiently low, ND/ N*D 
falls as trade liberalization increases (and ρ gets bigger). In this case, it will eventually fall below 
one. This will occur at lower levels of ρ, for increasing levels of asymmetries in the bargaining 
power of unions. If countries are asymmetric in size, then ND/ N*D will become smaller than one at 
higher levels of ρ – as a larger market size protects domestic firms from international competition 
despite the higher bargaining power of unions (and the wage that firms pay). 
 The number of exporters, NX, first grows and then falls in ρ for the country with the stronger 
unions; the larger the fixed export cost, the higher the level of ρ at which the ‘turning point’ occurs 
– for sufficiently high levels of fX, the number of exporters is always growing in ρ (Figure 6.a). This 
is consistent with the fact that the export cut-off can first grow and then fall in ρ (i.e. increases in ρ 
make it easier to export at sufficiently low levels of trade liberalization). Note however, that the 
switch in the sign of Xc ρ∂ ∂  (in Figure 6.b) can occur at higher levels of XN ρ∂ ∂ .23  Hence, even 
at levels of trade liberalization at which increases in ρ continue to reduce the minimum efficiency 
required to be able to export, the actual number of firms that will do so starts reducing – because if 
ρ is sufficiently low, the competitive pressure resulting from the increase in the number of foreign 
competitors dominates the minimum efficiency effect. Furthermore, the ‘expansionary’ aggregate 
effect of strong unions (and of a larger market size) implies that in the home country increases in ρ  
will (i) ‘attract’ industry  – i.e. increase entry and number of surviving firms, and can (ii) result in 
an increase in the extensive margin of exports (Figure 6.c) –  despite the fall in Xc . On the other 
hand, we find that the number of exporters increases monotonically in ρ for the country with the 
lower bargaining power of unions – even when this country is smaller (Figure 7.a). Indeed, the 
absolute number of exporters in this country is larger than in the one with the stronger unions 
(Figure 7.b). This seems to be robust to different parameters combinations, and is due to the fact 
that a lower bargaining power translates – other things equal – into a higher competitiveness of 
firms.  
                                                 
23 This holds for small differences in L (continuous line in Figure 6.a). 
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 The total number of varieties M bought by a consumer in the country with stronger unions 
usually decreases in ρ (as in the traditional case with no unions and equal labour supply). However, 
when the country has a very high relative bargaining power of unions – and hence a ceteris paribus 
large wage cost disadvantage – trade liberalisation will lead to a relatively large increase in the mass 
of imported varieties and hence to an overall expansion in the product variety available to 
consumers; this effect will be particularly strong at low levels of export costs. In these 
circumstances, trade liberalisation can lead to a pro-variety effect with an overall increase in M – 
even if the two countries are symmetric in size,24 as shown in Figure 8. When the level of trade 
openness is sufficiently large, this pro-variety effect typically also applies to the country with 
weaker unions, regardless of its relative size.25 
 In summary, the pro-variety effect of trade liberalization – characterising  Krugman's (1980) 
original contribution with homogeneous firms and also found in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with 
heterogeneous firms, but absent from Melitz’s (2003) model – can emerge not only when 
monopolistic firms are interconnected by vertical linkages (Nocco, 2011), or in the larger country 
when countries are asymmetric in size (Baldwin and Forslid, 2010),  but also in a small country 
when its unions are weaker than those in the trading partner. 
 Our simulations show that the price index is always decreasing in the level of trade openness 
(Figure 9), thus implying that the typical result of trade liberalisation leading to higher real wages 
holds in this framework. Moreover, regardless of the initial levels of trade costs, the price index 
tends to be smaller in the larger country, even if this is the one with stronger unions, because it is 
characterized by a larger number of varieties bought by consumers. 
 In terms of average firm size, given in expression (A.14) in the Appendix, the country with the 
lower bargaining power of unions has a higher average size of firms operating in the domestic 
market (i.e. the average is over both domestic and exporting firms) at all levels of integration and 
even when country size differences (in favour of the country with the stronger union) are very large. 
So whilst a larger country compensates the effects of a strong union in terms of the extensive 
margin, it does not do so in terms of the intensive margin. Additionally, if ρ increases, the average 
quantity produced falls at sufficiently high values of ρ in the more unionized country, provided that 
the difference in union bargaining power is sufficiently large. On the contrary, the average size of 
exporters is larger in the relatively more unionized country at all levels of openness. The intuition 
                                                 
24 This result differs from that obtained by Baldwin and Forslid (2010) where, with no unions, symmetry between 
countries results in the number of varieties available to consumers falling monotonically as the freeness of trade 
increases.  
25 In the absence of unions, as shown by Baldwin and Forslid (2010),  the pro-variety effect would only emerge for the 
larger nation when trade barriers are at intermediate levels, and never for the smaller country. In our case it can 
materialize also for the smaller country when its unions are weaker and the level of openness is sufficiently high 
because, in this case, this country will have a larger population of firms (i.e. ND/ N*D<1) despite its smaller size. 
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for this is that, in order to be able to export, in the more unionized country firms need to be more 
efficient in order to be able to offset the effects of a higher wage – which is consistent with the fact 
that the cut-off cX falls in v. For both countries, the average size of an exporter falls in ρ and 
differences in country size do not alter this result.  
 
3.2.  A reduction in fixed trade costs 
We now examine the effects on the cut-offs of a trade liberalization consisting in a fall in the fixed 
cost of exports; a reduction in Xf  can be thought of, for instances, as resulting from an international 
harmonisation of product standards and regulations that might reduce the adaptation and other costs 
associated with the introduction of foreign produced varieties into a market. The effects of this type 
of liberalisation are summarized in Table 2 below. The first row of Table 2 shows that the impact 
on domestic cut-offs are qualitatively the same as those generated by increases in ρ.  More 
specifically, we find that the sign of D
X
c
f
∂
∂  is positive (i.e. a reduction in Xf  reduces Dc ) if: 
(16)       v > Ω  
while the sign of 
*
D
X
c
f
∂
∂  is positive if: 
(17)       1v < Ω  
 
 
 
 
 
 
If  fX ↓ 
 
v < Ω  1vΩ < < Ω  
1v > Ω  
Dc ↑  
*
Dc ↓  
Dc ↓  
*
Dc ↓  
Dc ↓  
*
Dc ↑  
v < Θ  1vΘ < < Θ  
1v > Θ  
Xc ↓  
*
Xc ↑  
Xc ↑  
*
Xc ↑  
Xc ↑  
*
Xc ↓  
Table 2.    Effects of changes in Xf on the cut-offs (with  Ω<1 and Θ<1) 
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As for the case of a reduction in variable trade cost, the impact of a reduction in fixed export cost on 
the domestic cut-off Dc  is determined by two main effects: an import competition effect and an 
aggregate demand effect. The former occurs because foreign exporters find it easier to penetrate the 
domestic market – thus increasing the competitive pressure on domestic firms. This effect works 
towards a reduction in Dc . The aggregate demand effect results from a reduction in the industry 
price index triggered by the growth of the number of imported varieties, that leads to an increase in 
the aggregate demand for the differentiated good; the resulting increase in firms’ revenue makes it 
easier for firms to cover their fixed production costs. This effects works towards an increase in Dc . 
As before, the import competition effect is weaker when trade integration is already high. At the 
same time, the aggregate demand effect is stronger when domestic unions have a high bargaining 
power. Thus, for sufficiently high values of ρ and φ and for sufficiently low values of  v , the net 
effect of an increase in Xf   on  Dc  is positive.     
 However, the parameter ranges over which the effects of a reduction in Xf  on the cut-offs 
facing exporting firms are qualitatively similar to those resulting from an increase in ρ differ. 
Specifically, the sign of X
X
c
f
∂
∂  is positive when:  
(18)    
2 2
2 2
2 1
1 1
2
1 1
v with
κ ρ φσρφ κ κ ρ φσ σ
⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠< Θ ≡ Θ <⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
 , 
and that of 
*
X
X
c
f
∂
∂   is positive when  
(19)       1v < Θ . 
Both X
X
c
f
∂
∂  and 
*
X
X
c
f
∂
∂  are negative when the opposite inequalities hold. 
 The effects of reductions in Xf  on market structure are broadly qualitatively similar to those 
of increases in ρ. Specifically, we find that the number of entrants, NE, in the more unionized 
country does not monotonically fall with reductions in Xf : when variable trade costs are 
sufficiently large,  NE can increase if the inter-country difference in union power is not too large – 
i.e. if the country does not have too strong a competitive disadvantage due to higher wages – and 
the more unionized country is sufficiently larger than its trading partner (as illustrated in Figure 11). 
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So, qualitatively, the effects of liberalization on NE are the same regardless of the type of 
liberalization. 
 As discussed in the previous subsection, there is an interaction between the two forms of trade 
barriers: high levels of one can offset the effects of reductions in the other. For instance, for 
sufficiently low values of ρ, NE/NE* is more likely to be above one for given values of Xf  the larger 
is the domestic country (with stronger unions) relative to the foreign one (Figure 12). When the two 
countries are identical in size, NE/NE* tends to be smaller than one – i.e. the less competitive country 
is more likely to have a smaller number of entrants – and NE/NE* decreases when Xf  decreases. As 
before, the intuition is that a larger market can offset the negative effects on entry of higher wages.  
 The relative number of domestic firms selling in the domestic market with respect to that 
surviving in the other country, ND/ND*, is first increasing and then decreasing in Xf  when the home 
country is characterised by a higher bargaining power of unions (this can be seen in Figure 13). This 
happens when inter-country difference in labour force and in bargaining power are large (consistent 
with the case of liberalization resulting from a reduction in ρ). When the countries are symmetric in 
their size, ND/ND* is always increasing in Xf  and becomes greater than one for sufficiently large 
values of Xf . This is more likely the lower value is ρ, i.e. when variable trade costs are low. Hence, 
when countries are symmetric in their size, the number of domestic firms becomes larger than that 
operating in the foreign markets the higher the degree of protection (via Xf  and/or ρ) that the 
country has from foreign competition. Trade barriers offset the negative impact of stronger unions 
(and higher wages) on the number of firms surviving in the more unionized country.    
 Moreover, we find that NX/NX* is increasing in Xf , but it is always below 1 even when ρ is 
low, consistent with the case of  liberalization resulting from a reduction in ρ. 
 The total number of firms M operating in the domestic market (including foreign exporters) 
first falls and then increases with reductions in Xf . The fixed export cost influences the number of 
exporters more directly than changes in ρ. At high levels of fixed costs, the effect of a fall in fixed 
cost is dominated by the reduction in domestic varieties. When fixed costs of export are already 
low, the effect of further reductions in Xf  on the mass of varieties available to consumers is 
dominated by the large inflow of imports (that more than offsets the fall in domestic varieties). 
However, as we saw, this non-monotonicity of M can also occur with respect to increases in ρ for 
the country with the higher bargaining power of unions when fixed export costs are low. So, 
qualitatively, the effects of trade liberalization on M are the same regardless of the type of 
liberalization. 
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 Finally, as shown in the Appendix for the symmetric case, it is straightforward to see that an 
increase in the degree of economic integration (regardless of whether it is produced by a reduction 
in the level of variable or fixed trade costs) unambiguously increases the real wages of workers 
employed in both sectors. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have developed an international trade model in which firms in the imperfectly 
competitive sector are heterogeneous and face unionised labour markets. We highlight the 
interaction of openness to trade, unions’ bargaining power, and country asymmetries in affecting the 
process of competitive selection within industries.   
 For given levels of international openness, an increase in a country’s unions’ strength 
reduces the productivity cut-off facing domestic producers (thus lowering their average productivity) 
and increases that of exporters (thus raising their average productivity) – regardless of the relative 
size of countries. Trade liberalisation is shown to affect both extensive and intensive margins of 
export via the emergence of market access, competition, and aggregate demand effects whose 
magnitude depends on the initial level of openness to trade as well as on the degree of inter-country 
asymmetries in labour market institutions and size. Ceteris paribus, a relatively high bargaining 
power of unions in a country will translate in higher wages and thus weaken its firms’ competitive 
position vis-à-vis that of their competitors.  However, the higher wages will lead, other things equal, 
to a higher aggregate demand and thus reinforce standard market access mechanisms (stemming 
from the existence of trade barriers) by giving rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial 
levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry 
in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. 
For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization 
can result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers, 
in both countries – regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.  
 With respect to the (average) intensive margin of export we find it falls as a result of trade 
liberalisation, but that is larger in the relatively more unionized country at all levels of openness.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A.I  Labour demand, profits, income, employment and number of firms 
Given (5), domestic sales and exports of the firm are respectively given by: 
(A.1)  1
( ) ( )( )
1
m
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w i c iD i I
P
σ σ σ
σ
σμ σ
− − −
−
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*1
( ) ( )
( )
1
m
X
w i c i
D i I
P
σσ σ σ
σ
τσμ σ
−− − −
−
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ,   
while maximized profits obtained by firm i from its domestic sales and exports are: 
(A.2)  
1 1 1
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 Using the production functions ( )( )
( )
mD
D
l iq i
c i
=  and ( )( ) ( )
( )
mX
X X
l iq i D i
c i
τ= =  together with (A.1) 
the quantity of labour demanded by firm i for its domestic and export sales are respectively given 
by : 
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which can be used in (A.2) to rewrite the firm’s maximized profits from domestic and foreign sales 
as: 
(A.4)      ( ) ( )( )
1
m mD
D D
w i l ii fπ σ= −−        and  
( ) ( )( )
1
m mX
X X
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 Making use of (7) and the Pareto distribution in the aggregate price index of the differentiated 
good in the home country in (3), we obtain:  
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which, using (11) can be rewritten as: 
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M
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expression,  yields:  
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 Using equations (A.2), (6) and (9), income for the two countries can respectively be written 
as: 
(A.6)  
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which can be used to rewrite the profits from domestic sales and exports as: 
(A.7)  
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. 
 The total income of the home country is: c m mI L w L= +  . Given that c mL L L= − , this can be 
rewritten as: ( )1m mI L w L= + − . Making use of this and (A.5), the home country’s income in (A.6) 
can then be rewritten as:  
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Then, we can make use of (A.4) together with (A.7) and the wage in (6) to find that the 
amount of labour employed by firm i to produce for the local and the foreign market is respectively 
given by: 
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The expressions in (A.9) can then be used to compute the average labour quantities 
employed by firms to produce respectively for the domestic and the foreign markets: 
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
, and making use of (A.10) we 
can rewrite the level of labour employment in the manufacturing sector, jmL , as follows: 
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Finally, substituting mL from the previous expression into (A.8), we obtain that, for the home 
country: 
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This expression, together with the analogous expression for the foreign country, forms a system of  
two equations in two unknowns, EN  and 
*
EN ,
26 that are respectively given by 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }( )κρφμσ σρφμφρσσφρσφρσφρφρφρκ σσκμ κκ ,,,,,, 11~~1~111 ~11 11 * 22**** vvg vvvvLvvLvcf vcN DD ME −−+−−++−−+−−+ −++−=  
and 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }( )κρφμσ σρφμφρσσφρσφρσφρφρφρκ σσκμ κ
κ
,,,,,,
111~1~1
1
~
1
11
*
22*
*
*
*
vvg
vvvLvvLv
cf
vcN
DD
M
E
−−+−−++−−+
−
−
+
−++−= . 
Given that the function ( )κρφμσ ,,,,,, *vvg  in the denominator is common to both EN  and *EN ,  and 
that we know from (12) that ( ) ( )
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the domestic and the foreign markets as: 
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26 To solve this system, we rewrite *Dc  as a function of Dc , so that the solutions are expressed only in terms of Dc . 
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Finally, we can use (A.9) and (4) to write:  
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and find that the average output per-firm for the domestic market, Dq ,  and for the foreign market, 
Xq , are respectively given by: 
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Note that both average quantities are negatively related to the respective cut-offs and require, to be 
positive, that σκ > . 
 
A.II  Real wages 
Real wages in the monopolistic sector are given by: 
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σ
P
v
P
wm 1
1 −+=  
Substituting P  from (A.5) into (A.15) we obtain: 
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The three multiplicands in the numerator of (A.16) are all affected by changes in v: an increase in v 
unambiguously increases the first two factors, but its effect on the third is more difficult to assess 
given that it depends on the number of firms entering both markets ( EN  and 
*
EN ).  
 Given the complexity of the algebra, we establish analytically the redistributive effects 
produced by changes of v on the welfare level of workers only for the case of symmetric countries. 
The real wage of workers employed in the monopolistic sector given in expression (A.16) can be 
rewritten as:  
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which depends on the number of entrants and on the domestic cut-off. The number of entrant is 
given by 
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v
NE . Hence, with symmetric countries, an increase in v unambiguously 
increases the real wage of workers employed in the monopolistic sector. However, an increase in v 
unambiguously lowers the real wage of workers employed in the competitive sector, which by 
making use of (6), (A.17) and (A.18), can be rewritten as:  
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From (6), (A.17) and (A.18), it is straightforward to see that, under symmetry, an increase in the 
degree of economic integration (regardless of whether it is produced by a reduction in the level of 
variable or fixed trade costs) unambiguously increases the real wages of workers employed in both 
sectors. 
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Figure 4.a. ND
L = 1000, v = 0:4
Black line: fX= 0:2
Blue line: fX= 0:8
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Figure 4.b. ND
L = 1000, v = 0:4
Black line: fX= 0:2
Blue line: fX= 0:8
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Figure 5.a. ND=ND
L = 2000
 v = 0:5 vs ... v = 0:7
Black lines: fX= 0:2
Blue lines: fX= 0:8
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Figure 5.b. ND=ND
L = 1000
v = 0:7
Black line: fX= 0:2
Blue line: fX= 0:8
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Figure 6.a. NX
v = 0:5
 L = 1200 vs ... L = 2000
Black lines: fX = 0:2
Blue lines: fX = 0:8
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Figure 6.b. cD, cD, cX , c

X
v = 0:5
Black lines: domestic cD ( ) and cX (...)
Green lines: foreign cD ( ) and c

X (...)
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Figure 6.c. NX
L = 2000
 v = 0:3 vs ... v = 0:35
fX = 0:2
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Figure 7.a. NX
L = 2000, v = 0:5
Black line: fX= 0:2
Blue line: fX= 0:8
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Figure 7.b. NX=NX
L = 2000, v = 0:5
Black line: fX= 0:2
Blue line: fX= 0:8
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Figure 8. M () and M(...)
L = 1000, v = 0:7
Black line: fX= 0:2
Blue line: fX= 0:8
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Figure 9. PM and P M
L = 2000, v = 0:5, fX= 0:2
Continuous line: PM
Dotted line: P M
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Figure 10.a. qD and qD
v = 0:5
 qD vs ... qD
Black lines: fX= 0:2
Blue lines: fX= 0:8
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Figure 10.b. qX and qX
v = 0:5
 qX vs ... qX
Black lines: fX= 0:2
Blue lines: fX= 0:8
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Figure 11. NE
L = 2000, v = 0:5
Black line:  = 0:7
Blue line:  = 0:2
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Figure 12. NE=NE
v = 0:7
 L = 1000 vs ... L = 2000
Black lines:  = 0:7
Blue lines:  = 0:2
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Figure 13. ND=ND
v = 0:7
 L = 1000 vs ... L = 2000
Black lines:  = 0:7
Blue lines:  = 0:2
